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PROCEDURAL ANOMALIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES 
- by PROF. J. l\f. GANADO, B.A., Ph.D.(Lond), LL.D. 
I. WIDENING SCOPE OF SUCH CONTROVERSIES 
Since the creation of the Constitutional Court in 1964, the number of lawsuits 
concerning the Constitutic>n and its Fundamental Rights sections has been very 
limited. This may reflect well on the drafting of the Constitution and also on the 
absence of violations of the guaranteed Fundamental Rights, but -it may also be 
due to an insufficiency of awareness on the part of the population in general, as to 
the full implications of the standards imposed by the constitutional provisions and 
the types of remedies ensuing therefrom. It is incumbent upon everyone, and espe-
cially the members of the legal profession, to question even long accepted prac-
tices and to apply to them the tests resulting from the con...c1titutional provisions. 
For example, according to long standing practice, an arrested person is not given a 
written statement of rthe charges for which he is placed under arrest. The charge 
is read out in Court and copies can be taken by the accused or his lawyer. However, 
the Constitution requires that the accused be supplied with a written chargesheet 
and: had it not been for the exclusion of the basic Codes from the purview of s.47 
of the Constitution, the procedure that had normally been followed might well have 
been held to be unconstitutional{!). 
Let us take another example. Being 
confronted with a claim for additional 
tax comes within the experience of pro-
bably the majority of taxpayers. As 
the Income Tax Act gives the Commis-
sioner an administrative discretion in 
regard to the imposition of such addi-
tional tax, it has unfortunately been 
the practice of the Board of Special 
Commi~ioners not to interfere with the 
circumstances and reasons leading to 
its imposition (2). In 1964, up the enact-
ment of the Constitution which gua-
ranteed a fair hearing by an impartial 
body on all matters concerning the de-
termination of civil rights(3), any form 
of discretion on the part of the Com-
missioner on a matter which is really 
of a judicial or quasi-judicial character 
became unconstitutional. The result is 
that either the Commissioner has lost 
his discretion or, alternatively, the 
Board wil"l have to investigate the fah- · 
ness or otherwise of the imposition of 
the additional tax ( 4). 
Nothing contained in or done under 
the authority of the provisions of the 
Civil Code, Commercial Code, Criminal 
Code, Code of Police laws, Code of Civil 
Procedure{S) and the Land Expropria-
tion Laws (as obtaining in 1964(6)) can 
be regarded as being in violation of. the 
Human Rights provisions. The exclu-
sion of these Codes or Laws from the 
application of the Fundamental Rights 
provisions may have been due to a fear 
that the task of modifying th~ basfo 
codes would have been too much and 
too dangerous to complete within the 
period of three years imposed by the 
Constitution for the amendment of 
Laws for the purpose of making them 
conform. to the Constitution. There was 
only one case (7) in which it was alleged 
that a provision of one of the basic 
Codes (namely the Criminal Code., was 
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in conflict with the Constitutional pro-
visions. There are undoubtedly other 
cases of conflict, but there is no reasl)n 
why one should harbour any special 
fear that the removal of the special 
treatment accorded to the basic Codes 
would lead to undue confusi m and 
change. If an individual claims that the 
Human Rights sections of the Consti-
tution are being violated by the provi-
sions of these codes, he should be at 
liberty to raise the matter for the 
Court to apply the appropriate rem.oily. 
The position of the Land Acquisition 
Ordinances may present a different 
case as it is known that the compensa-, 
tion awardable under those Ordinances 
is in most instances less than reason-
able and adequate compensation and a 
Court would certainly hold them to be 
unconstitutional. It seems, therefore, 
that these Ordinances should be exa-
mined and discussed on their own par -
ticular merits and the necessary chan-
ges should be effected by legislati0n:s.1. 
It has been officially stated that the 
individual petition to the Commission 
and Court of Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe is going to be re-
cognized by the Government of Malta. 
This is a welcome step, but one must 
appreciate that su<!h a right is ~atur­
ally restricted within the margms of 
the European . Convention of Huma.11 
Rights. The same liberal tendency 
should have the effect of eliminating 
the basic Codes from the entrenched 
position which they possess at the 
present moment and also to liberalize 
the Constitution or correct the defects 
which have so far appeared(9) . 
The above suggestions may possibly 
increase the numbers of lawsuits in-
volving constitutional issues. In the 
limited number of cases we have had 
so far, doubts have ar.isen on the .ex-
tent of the Constitutional Court's JUr-
i'1.diction in relation to that of the 
Court of Appeal and a greater incid-
ence of such lawsuits will undoubtedly 
have the effect of highlighting the dif-
ficulties on jurisdiction and the inade-
quacy of the procedure when such dif-
ficulties arise. It is therefore neces-
sary to rectify the position also from 
the purely procedural angle. 
II. Jurisd:ictir>n of Constitutional Court 
According to s.96(2) of the Consti-
tution, the Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction to hear and determine:-
(a) Such questions as are referred 
to in s.64 of the Constitution, namely 
any question whether-
(i) Any person has been validly 
elected as a member of the 
House of Representatives. 
(ii) Any member of the House has 
vacated his seat therein or is 
required by the Constitution 
to cea.se to perform his func-
tions as a member 
(iii) Any person has been validly 
elected· as Speaker f r o m 
among persons who are not 
members of the House, or 
having been so elected, has 
vacated the office of Speaker. 
(b) Appeals from decisions of the 
First Hall of Her Majesty's Civil Court 
under s.4 7 of the Constitution, which 
is the section granting an action for 
the enforcement of the provisions pro-
tectinng the Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Individual. It should 
here be noted that if an action had al-
ready been made under a previous 
Constitution in order to enforce some 
Human Rights section, an appeal from 
the relative judgment is to be made 
to the Court of Appeal and not to the 
Constitutional Court, (10) bec~use the 
Constitution in this sub-section refers 
specifically to Fundamental Rights 
Actions based on the 1964 Constitu-
tion. 
(c) Appeals from decisions of any 
Court of original jurisdiction in Malta 
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on questions as to the interpretation of 
the 1964 Constitution. It must be noted 
that the First Hall of the Civil Court is 
not the only Court of original jurisdic-
tion. The provision certainly includes 
the Commercial Court and the Courts 
of Gozo in their superior jurisdiction. 
Would the Inferior Courts be included? 
They are Courts of original jurisdic-
tion; it is true that they have a juris-
diction severely limited by value but a 
question of interpretation of the Con-
stitution may arise as an incidental 
matter to a lawsuit within their juris-
diction. ( lOa) 
(d) Appeals from decisions of any 
Court or original jurisdiction in Malta 
on question as to the validity of laws. 
The same comment made in respect of 
(c) applies here too. 
In both sub.paras. (c) and (d) we 
find an exclusion as to those decisions 
which may fall under the Fundamental 
Rights sections of the Constitution. It 
seems that this exclusion is i}\troduced 
merely for the purpose of avoiding du-
plication. In fact, all appeals from de-
cisions on actions made under those 
sections will go to the Constitutional 
Court in accordance with sub-para (b). 
ID. Division and proliferation of 
actions 
Even a cursory reading of s.96 
shows that in regard to sub-para. (c) 
and (d), the ConstitutionaJ Court will 
be called upon to deal possibly only 
with one aspect of a particular lawsuit. 
For example, in the Broadcasting 
Authority Case, (11) the action was 
based on s.122 of the Constitution and 
on s. 7 of the Broadcasting Ordinance. 
Questions on interpretation of the for-
mer would have to be decided upon by 
the Constitutional Court, while ques-
tions on the interpretation of the latter 
would have to be decided by the Court 
of AppeaJ. It often happens that in one 
action various legal grounds are put 
forward, with the result that if one o-t 
them happens to be a provision of the 
Constitution needing some form of in-
terpretation for the purpose of apply-
ing it to the particular case, the Court 
of Appeal will find itself without jur-
isdiction to determine the issue. 
With regard to actions based on the 
Fundamental Rights provisions of the 
Constitution, from a procedural point 
of view,, it may appear that there is 
no dificulty. In fact all actions based 
on s.47 must be commenced by means 
of an application filed before the First 
Hall of the Civil Court (12) and ap-
peal therefrom is to be made again by 
application to t h e Constitutional 
Court (13). However, even here it may 
happen that a plaintiff may wish to 
base his claim on various grounds, 
some based on the ordinary law and 
some based on the Fundamental Rights 
pravisions. In sueh a case, it is neces-
sary to make two ,separate actions: 
one by means of a Writ of summ-0ns 
and the other by means of an applica-
tion. Although they are filed before 
the same Court, it is very often the 
case that they are heard by different 
Judges, unless a specific order is given 
by the Court to have the two cases 
dealt with together; (14) however, the 
existence of two separate actions in-
variably causes difficulties of preced-
ence and delays in the hearings.. Two 
s·eparate cases lead to two separate 
appeals and, for the reasons mention-
ed later, two separate cases may easily 
proliferate into three or four separate 
appeals. 
Actions based on the Fundamental 
Rights sections are normally intended 
to be made use of only in def a ult of 
other rights of action based; if a per-
son has a right of action under nor-
mal law, he is expected to avail himself 
of that right of action before resort-
ing to the Fundamentnal Rights sec-
tions (15). The difference in the pro-
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cedure may perhaps be intended tu 
underline this difference between these 
two remedies. However, the r.ule that 
a. plaintiff should not resort to the 
Fundamental Rights action, if he pos-
sesses other actions or until he has 
exhausted his other remedies, is not a 
binding rule in accordance with s.4 7 but 
only a rule of guidance to the Court 
which has a discretion not to grant the 
remedy under s.4 7 if it is satisfied that 
other remedies are available. 
Certainly it would be quicker, less 
expensive and more practical for the 
same Court to hear all the evidence and 
submissions in one and the same case 
and then decide whether to make use 
of the discreteion which the law con-
fers upon it. The effectiveness of these 
remedies very often lies in their being 
given quickly and it is imperative that 
procedural complexities be eliminated 
as much as possible. 
IV ~~:eltilltmn of the 
~ 
With regard to the exclusive JUr1s-
diction of the Constitutional Court to 
interpret the Constitution, from a the-
oretical point of view there may seem 
to be no difficulties hut in practice we 
come across the problem as to what 
is really meant by 'interpretation of 
the Constitution'. Surely, a mere refe-
rence to a provision of the Constitution 
or a mere application of it is not 'inter-
pretation'. Interpretation in the strict-
ly technical sense of the term comes 
into play only when there is a matter 
of doubt as to the meaning of a par-
ticular provision or as to its extent or 
mode of application to a particular 
case. It is, however, obvious that the 
line of demarcation, where mere read-
ing and understanding end and inter-
pretation in the proper sense begins, 
is an extremely uncertain line and very 
often depends on the subjective cri-
teria of the particular Judge. It is to 
te expected that, if a Judge feels that 
a provision of the Constituti'on is not 
clear and calls for interpretation, he 
should f:ay so clearly, and, if he has 
jurisdict:.on, decide the point separate-
ly; alternatively, if he does not have 
jurisdiction to decide the issue, then 
one of the parties wiJ be given a time-
limit to make the appropriate proceed-
ings. In either case, an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court is possible. 
The Constitution refers to the case 
in which a point of interpretation of 
the Constitution arises 'for the first 
time before a Court of second in. 
stance'. What do the words., 'for the 
first time' really mean? The point may 
have been r.ef erred to, directly or in-
directly before the Court of first in-
stance, but neither the parties nor the 
Court ma.y have considered that the 
question raised an issue of interpreta-
tion properly E:-0 caUed More import-
ance may be given to the issue when 
the matter is discused further after 
the judgment. Would the point have 
been raised for the 'first time' when 
it is discussed again before the Court 
of Appeal and the Court of Appeal 
feels that, strictly speaking, interpre-
ta.tion by the Constitutional Court ts 
called for? The reply to the question 
may bring aoout effects of consider-
able practical importance. In fact, if 
there is some point of interpretation, 
then an appeal should be made not only 
to the Court <;>f Appeal on the merits 
of the cas·e but also to the Constitu· 
tionanl Court on the question of interR 
pretation of the Constitution. Failure 
to make such a ~ond appeal' may 
mean that rthe question cannot be 
raised again as that part of the judg-
ment would have amounted to an im-
plied 'reSl judfoata''. After all, the 
Court of Appeal would not be able to 
say that the question had arisen 'for 
the first time' before it and, therefore, 
\t would not be in a position to give the 
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reference which is provided for in s.47 
( 3) of the Constitution. The position 
can produce serious hardship and un-
fairness and should not be allowed to 
stay as it is. 
The three appeal judges are normal-
ly also three of the judges sitting in 
the Constitutional Court. It is often 
very clificult to take a point of inter-
pretation in isolation from the merits 
of a case or at least some of the main 
facts of the case. In the judgment of 
the Constitutional Court there may be 
certain expressions of opinion re-
flecting on the merits of the case. 
Would the judges of the Court of a p-
peal be able to continue the hearing 
before the Court of Appeal or w-0uld 
they find themselves debar.red from 
continuing the hearing on the grounds 
of some ·expression of opinion in tlie 
Constitutional Court's judgment re-
flecting on the merits? This depends 
on the details of each case but if they 
have to abstain, there will be obvious 
practieal difficulties by reason of the 
small number of judges on our bench. 
V. Cbnfllets of Jurisc&tlon 
With regard to the exclusive juris-
diction of the Constitutional Court to 
decide on questions of validity of laws, 
much the same difficulties that have 
been encountered in regard to the in-
terpretation af the Constitution can 
arise. A problem has arisen in a case 
which wil probably remain unique(l6). 
There is still penrung before the Court 
of Appeal a Human Rights action in· 
stited on the basis of the 1961 Consti· 
tution. The Act impugned was Act I of 
1963 enacted on the 15th February 
1963. As the action was not a Funda-
mental Rights case based on s.4 7 of 
the Constitution, it obviously did not 
fall within s.96(b) of the 1964 Consti-
tution but it did involve the question of 
the validity of Act I of 1963. There-
! or-e, the ~ificulty arose as to whet'her 
it came within s.96(d) referring gen-
erically to questions of the validity of 
laws without any limitation. Two ap· 
peals were made and quite a long time 
had to elapse before the hearing of 
the case could actually commence, in 
order to discuss which of the bearings 
~hould take precedence. Ultimately it 
was decided that, although one of the 
points at issue was the validity of a 
law still that point arose as part of a 
Human Rights action based on the 
1961 Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court declared itself to be incompetent 
and the case was held to fall within 
the sole jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeal. Both parties to the case fav-
c·ured the adoption of such a solution 
because at l~ast it terminated the un-
certainty that had prevailed and the 
necessity of dividing the actions into 
two parts with unavoidable confusions 
and delays. 
VI. Conclusion 
Most of the difficulties to which I 
have referred have already been en-
countered. There is no doubt that there 
are other la-tent ones. The main sug-
gestions that arise from the observa-
tions made in the present paper are 
the following: 
a. The basic Codes should be removed 
from their present entrenched po-
sition. 
b. Any judgement of the Constitu· 
tional Court on the question of 
jurisdiction or extent thereof, 
should be binding on any other 
Court and, in case of conflict of 
judgements on such matters, the 
judgement of the Constitutional 
Court should prevail. 
c. The procedure in oonstitution~l 
matters should be more flexible. 
Particularly, the Court should 
have authority to give relief 
in cases in which time·limits for 
the making of appeals are deemed 
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to have lapsed on account of the 
procedural difficulties animadvert-
ed upon. This amounts to the "res-
titurt:io in integrum" which tradi-
tionallly existed in our procedural 
system but which was recently 
held to have been tacitly abro-
gated( 19). 
d. In the cases in which the prescrib-
ed procedure before the Court of 
First Instance is by a.p.plication, 
the procedure by writ of summons 
< 1) Police-vs-iFranc-esco Oerto decided by 
the Constitutional Court on the 14th 
August 1008. 
<2) Deci-sions Nos. 23/ 66; 3il/ 66; L6/7l0 
decided by the Board of special Com-
mission€rs for Income Tax an<l Tax 
Cases Nos. 29, ~. 5'7. 84 delivered by 
H.M. Court o-f Appeail. 
(3) S.4I0(2) of the Constitution. 
(4) The point was raised :in a urn in-
come tax appeal. How-ever, 1t was 
not declded by the Oourt, because 
the additional tax was canc-elled by 
the Commissioner of Inlan<l Rev-
enue. 
(!)) Vide First Schedule to the Constitu-
tion and s.41!W7) of the Constitution. 
(6) S.48(9) of the Constitution. 
(7) Polic.e-vs-Certo supra. 
(8) The hardshi-p arising from the appli-
cation of the pr-0visions of the Land 
Acqu1sltion Ordinances was the cause 
of an appeal to the Judicial Com-
mit.tee. of the Pnvy council in the 
case Depasquale noe. et vs Aqu111na 
et disposed of by the Judicial Oom~ 
mittee on the 11lth March 19'71. The 
Judicial Committee agreed with the 
Court of Appeal's rigid and literal in-
terpretation of the provisions of the 
Ordinances in contrast with the lib-
eral interpretation followed by the 
First Court. (9> One exam1>Le of a serious defect that 
has been encountered in practiee 
r·elates to s.8-r(3) where by the Con-
stitution the Prime Minister 1s re-
quired. t.o :perform any function in 
accordance with 'the r.ecommenda-
tion of or, after consultation with , 
any person or authority, the ques-
ti-On whether he has in any case re-
ceived, or act€d in accordance with 
such recommendation or whether he 
has consulted with such :person or 
authority shall not be enquired intp 
in any Court. This provisi()n in 
reality stultifies the guarantees af-
forded by other provisions of the 
Constitution. During the pre-Ind-e-
pendence talks, this provision was 
criti-cise<l by the Malta Labour Party 
which suggestect that it should be 
should be equally valid. In this 
way the incidence of duplication of 
actions will be diminished. In s. 164 
of the Code of Civ11 Procedure 
there is a precedent for alterna-
titve modes .of procedure and the 
Court is given a wide discretion. 
e. Greater woeedural flexibility for 
references to the Constitutional 
Court directly or to the Civii Court 
should be introduced. 
restricted only to the cases in which 
the Prime !Minister is required to 
consult with any person or autho-
rity, but should not apply to the 
cases in which h.e1 is required to act 
in accor<lance with the .recommen-
da-tion ·of any person or authority 
CVi<Le p. 99 of "Malta Independence 
Conf erenee 1003 - M.'M.S.O. Amend 
21~1) 
Such a suggestion was fully justified 
and 1t is strange that it was not 
adopted in 1964. 
< 10> Ganado noe.-vs-'Borg Olivier n c>e. anji 
Ganado noe.-v.s-Felice noe. decided 
by the Constitutional Court on the 
1-0th March 19'71. 
<11) Mintoff noe.-vs-Montanaro Gauci 
noo, doecided by the court of At>J>eal 
on the 22nd May 19'71. 
<12) s.2 of the Fundamental Rie;hts and 
a;'reedoms Rules of Court 1964 (-L.N. 
4i8 Of 19&4) 
(13") s.2 -0f H.M.'s Constitutional Court 
Rues of Court 1-964 (L.N.49' of 1004). 
(14) Such an Order was given by thP. 
First Hall of the Civil Court in the 
case Mintoff noe. - vs - Montanaro 
Gauci noe. wh-ich was ·ultimately 
withdrawn before the Constitutional 
Court on the 24th June 19'11. 
<15) The proviso to s.4'7(2) of the Consti-
tution. 
(1 6"} Ganado noe.-vs.-Borg Olivier n oe. 
and Ganado noe.-vs.-Felice noe. 
which are pending before the Court 
of Appeal. 
{ 17) s. 77~ et seq. of the Cede of Ci vii Pro-
cedure. 
<la> The possibUity of both Courts dec-
clininp.; j urisdicti<Jn arose in a Gozo 
app~al. With regard to the decision 
of a particular point of procedure 
both the Court of Appeal in Malt~ 
and thP. Gozo Court of Appeal held 
themselves not to hav·e jur!S<ii-ct!on (vidP. Compagno noe vs. Bajada et. 
decided by the Malta .C~urt of Ap. 
peal on the 23rd Februat'y 1962). 
l 19> Vide Judg-m:nt of H.M. Cout't cf au-
peal On its Inferior Jurisdiction) ·1n 
cas e ''!Misrahi vs, Cassar" of lQth 
J·une 1965. 
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